

# Online Library Part 1 Operational Art Gov Pdf Free Copy

The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927-1991  
The Levels of War, Operational Art and Campaign Planning  
The Evolution of Operational Art  
Operational Design: Distilling Clarity from Complexity for Decisive Action  
Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art  
The Evolution of Operational Art  
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The Operational Art  
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Operations (ADP 3-0)  
Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare  
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Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art  
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Operational Logistics

This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for understanding and applying design, show how design enhances decision making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences between design in major combat operations and design in counterinsurgency (COIN). The contents of this study should not be construed as either prescriptive or mechanistic. Warfare is a multifaceted entity conducted in evolving operational environments and against complex, adaptive adversaries. Design is not a sequential methodology or a simplistic checklist. It is a foundational part of operational art that provides the crucial element of structure. This heuristic examination of design simply searches for a way to explain design's intricate structural relationships and highlight the intrinsic potential for deliberately crafting decision analysis. When commanders and staffs approach operational design from this perspective, we move one step closer to the natural masters of the art of war. Preface -- Introduction -- The time before -- The expansion of war and the birth of operational art -- Operational art in Germany -- Operational art gets a name : Tukhachevskiy and deep attacks - - The British school : bloodless war and "strategic paralysis" -- Operational art : the next steps -- Conclusion : operational art is not the

whole of warfare -- only a discretionary part of it. This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War. Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. An intermediate link between strategy and tactics has always existed, but a distinct concept that encompasses a systematic and deliberate plan of campaign for major operations is a mere two hundred years old. Based on country specific case-studies, this book describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. The point of departure is the campaigns of 'the God of War', Napoleon Bonaparte. The book then proceeds with chapters on the evolution of operational art in Prussia / Germany, the Soviet Union / Russia, the United Kingdom, United States, Israel, and China. The final chapter deals with the future of operational art in irregular warfare. Theory is critical to refining and improving existing methods of applying operational warfare, and its importance cannot be overstated; however, to be useful, theory and its accompanying vocabulary must be combined with a proper examination of historical trends and practical experience. The present volume attempts to achieve that combination. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. This work considers the modern antecedents and evolution of the operational art in military thought and practice in both peace and wartime. This theme is developed over time and across military cultures. A comparative framework allows the treatment of the overall theme by examining the concept of the operational art in the context of different nationalities, different military organizations, and different societies. This study situates the current operational art in its historical context. NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last  
Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, a companion volume to Clayton R. Newell's

and Michael D. Krause's On Operational Art, captures the doctrinal debate over the evolving concept of operational art-the critical link between strategy and tactics-in the face of the new complexities of warfare and the demands of irregular operations in the twenty-first century. Consisting of fifteen original essays selected and edited by Michael D. Krause in collaboration with R. Cody Phillips, the well-organized anthology presents the collective view of distinguished military historians and scholars that operational art must be adjusted to accommodate the changing circumstances happening around the world, especially when dealing with broad coalitions and alliances in regional environments and at an international level. Related products: The Rise of iWar: Identity, Information, and the Individualization of Modern Warfare can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01198-2> Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-070-00865-3> A Masterpiece of Counter guerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines 1901-1902 is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01000-5> Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01061-7> On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed. On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the

brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed. This collection of texts has been taken from formerly classified material in the official Red Army General Staff journal 'Military Thought'. The results are two volumes of great scope based on archival evidence. They stand as a compulsory reference point for anyone with an interest in the operational endeavours of the Soviet Army from the 1920's onward. This thesis examines the generalship, leadership, and operational art of General James N. Mattis, US Marine Corps by using Task Force 58 in Afghanistan as a formative base and then comparing elements of operational art to the conduct of the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003. Mattis draws upon many historical influences that shape his operational design in both campaigns. He puts great effort and focus on ensuring that his commander's intent is understood by all his subordinates and uses a preference for a small staff in the planning and execution of his intent. He makes heavy use of personally selected liaison officers to form and sustain habitual relationships with higher and adjacent units. Through the use of historical examples and a refusal to be constrained by doctrine and popular thought he uses innovative approaches in his design. These innovative approaches often constitute paradigm shifts with contemporary thought and doctrine. A 'Mattis Way of War' is postulated in the conclusion which draws from his use of history, commander's intent, and leadership to build up a capacity, or potential energy, for action in his unit. Once built up, he unleashes this energy utilizing explicit trust in his staff and subordinates. Operation Husky, the Allied World War II invasion of Sicily, featured the clash of an Allied Army Group against an Axis Army. The Allied 15th Army Group was composed of fourteen divisions - an impressive total when one considers that combined, the United States and British Armies only have twelve active duty divisions today. Further, the Axis were a formidable opponent who skillfully employed combined arms maneuver, aggressively attacked the 15th Army Group, and contested Allied air superiority. In light of the United States Army's decade long focus on wide area security, this monograph examines Operation Husky through the lens of the elements of operational art to draw out lessons for modern planners who are changing their focus to large formation combined arms maneuver. The Allies skillfully incorporated lines of operation, decisive points, operational reach, basing, culmination, and risk. However, they poorly employed the elements of center of gravity, tempo, and phasing, which arguably allowed much of the Axis Army to retrograde to

Italy in good order. The reason for this poor employment was poor planning. Therefore this monograph recommends that large scale combined arms maneuver operations be completely planned prior to execution, that there is a deliberate plan to plan, that the planning is fully resourced, and finally, that planners integrate all domains, land, sea, air, space, and cyber, in their application of operational art. Operation Husky is a rich depository of vicarious experience in large scale combined arms maneuver for today's field grad officers. This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Introduction \* Organization of the Monograph \* Operational Art and its Elements \* 1. Sicily in July 1943 \* The Desired Endstate \* The Operational Environment \* 2. The Plan for Operation Husky \* The Allied Concept \* Critique Using the Elements of Operational Art \* 3. The Execution of Operation Husky \* Lessons for Today's Officers \* 4. Conclusion The purpose of this monograph is to prepare today's United States Army officers for large scale combined arms maneuver. To understand large scale combined arms maneuver it evaluates Operation Husky, the World War II invasion of Sicily, using today's United States Army definition of operational art and the elements of operational art. This is not an effort to judge the World War II commanders and staff with the benefit of hindsight, but rather to draw lessons from historical experience that an Army officer today could apply in a future war characterized by large formation combined arms maneuver. With this perspective, the lessons from Operation Husky are that the Allies did not focus on the Axis center of gravity, maintain an aggressive tempo, or use phasing. However, the reason for these failures on the part of the Allies was their flawed planning. Therefore the recommendation for today's army officers is that large scale combined arms maneuver must be planned in detail, that the detailed planning must be planned and resourced, and that planners should integrate all domains, land, sea, air, space, and cyber, in their application of operational art. The immediate goal of this monograph is to determine what contribution VII Corps made to the evolution of operational art in Operation Desert Storm. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait resulted in Iraq controlling much of the world's proven oil reserves which posed a serious threat to Western interests. The United States defined the political objectives. used joint warfare and decisive force in the Persian Gulf War. The United States sought a military solution consisting of using overwhelming force to protect national interests through the liberation of Kuwait. In a ground conflict that concluded in a rapid victory which lasted 100 hours the military successfully conducted Operation Desert Storm and drove the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. Iraq lost over half its army. VII Corps role in Operation Desert Storm provides a good basis for examining the contribution it made to operational art VII Corps under the command of LTG Franks had become the largest armored corps ever assembled VII Corps was the main effort for the execution of ARCENT's ground maneuver plan. The question remains to consider what aspects of operational art were

developed and extended by VII Corps operations? This monograph pursues the answers to those questions by first defining the characteristics of operational art. The paper then looks at the implications of the strategic environment that may have influenced the VII Corps operations in Desert Storm Next. we look closely at VII Corps and overlay the planning and execution of their operations upon the characteristics of operational art to reach the papers conclusions. The results show that the operational environment will become more and more difficult to operate in. Planners must successfully use the assets they have available to prevail. This book is about theory and the use of theory to develop doctrine. In light of the dramatic capabilities envisioned for the "Objective Force," the organized U.S. military mechanism of physical coercion, and the dynamic operational environment that characterizes the world of 2002, land and naval theory is examined, investigated and analyzed. A common perception is that maritime strategy and land strategy exist in discrete and separate spheres of knowledge. However, closer analysis demonstrates that they do not exist as independent areas of study, rather, they are merely divisions in the overall art of war. To develop and illustrate this concept, a general overview of the future threat/operational environment and the proposed characteristics and capabilities of the U.S. Army's Objective Force are presented. Manifest from this description of the Objective Force and the future threat, an apparent analogy between the Objective Force and a naval force becomes evident, even while it is increasingly apparent that technological advances are blurring the traditional distinctions between the divisions in the art of war - between land, sea and air warfare. The functional divisions are becoming less distinct, increasingly interrelated and integrated. Through this analogy to maritime operations, the following two constructs or paradigms are proposed to help guide the development of doctrine in the theoretical employment of the U.S. Army's Objective Force. 1. The "object" or goal of Objective Force warfare is command of the white space, in other words, "freedom of action." Objective Force commanders must act to retain and preserve freedom of action. This must be the theoretical basis for all doctrine. 2. The corollary of this is to preserve the "force in being." Objective Force commanders must employ maritime concepts to understand and govern the reasoned concentration and dispersal of forces. In combination, the concepts are related thusly, the core object or goal of Objective Force warfare is to control, that is, to exercise and retain ones freedom of action... this is the essence of the maritime concept "fleet in being." The arguments presented throughout are based on the demonstration of analogy between naval and Objective Force land warfare. The line of logic to the conclusion reached is that maneuver warfare was developed broadly to counter and defeat the inherent strength of the defense on land. Operational maneuver concepts were the ultimate expression of maneuver and the solution to industrialized, mass attrition warfare between nation-states. Objective Force maneuver is the embodiment and realization of operational maneuver, the basis of which is the

exploitation and retention of "freedom of action." Freedom of action is therefore the essential, core criteria in any concept or theory that applies to or governs Objective Force employment. Evidence has substantiated the analogy between the characteristics of naval forces and Objective Forces. Theoretical and conceptual reasoning and arguments have demonstrated that freedom of action, that is, control of maritime communications or command of the sea has been the central construct in maritime strategy as well. The analogous core criteria, freedom of action, demonstrate that maritime concepts may be applied confidently to Objective Force employment. Assuming the inherent capabilities of the Objective Force are achieved; given the projected characteristics of the future operating environment... If maritime concepts were applied to Objective Force employment, the resulting operational actions would be consistent, as envisioned, to address and counter effectively the future threats in the future operating environment. Going Big by Getting Small examines how the United States Special Operations Forces apply operational art, the link between tactics and strategy, in the non-wartime, steady-state environments called Phase Zero. With revised and innovative operational art constructs, US Special Operations offer scalable and differentiated strategic options for US foreign policy goals. This book analyzes light footprint special operations approaches in Yemen, Indonesia, Thailand, and Colombia. When a large military presence may be inappropriate or counterproductive, Colonel Brian Petit makes the case for fresh thinking on Phase Zero operational art as applied by small, highly skilled, joint-force teams coupled with interagency partners. The past decade (2002-2012) of operations focused on large-scale, post-conflict counterinsurgency. Less publicized, but no less important in this same decade, was the emerging application of nuanced campaigns, actions, and activities in Phase Zero. These efforts were led or supported by special operations in countries and regions contested, but not at war. This book fills a gap in the literature of how to adapt the means, method, and logic of US military foreign engagements in a diplomacy-centric world with rapidly shifting power paradigms. Going Big by Getting Small is not a yarn on daring special operations raids nor a call for perpetual war. It is the polar opposite: this book contemplates the use of discreet engagements to sustain an advantageous peace, mitigate conflict, and prevent crises. ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint

task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well. One can argue that the development of true doctrine required the formal adoption of the concept of operational art. Prior to the Great War, no army in the world possessed a codified body of thought that enabled senior military commanders to visualize the aggregate effects of tactical engagements across time and space. By 1918, after a dramatic revision of drill regulations into something approaching true doctrine, the German army was furthest in realizing this goal. Ultimately, though, the Germans could not translate tactical success into strategic victory because they could not resource military operations in sufficient depth to render local successes decisive. Understanding that the character of warfare in 1918 was radically different from 1914 would have enabled Ludendorff to see the flaws in the MICHAEL offensives and perhaps mitigate them. And although the interwar German Army spent a great deal of effort reflecting on the lessons of 1914-1918, German understanding of the operational art remained incomplete. The separate and unequal Allied efforts against Nazi Germany in World War II, followed immediately by the superpower competition of the Cold War, created a significant gap in American officers' understanding of the factors that contributed to Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. As a result, in the decades following the war the concept of "operational art" was recognized and adopted by the US Army almost as a proprietary creation. In the 1990s, however, Western military historians and theorists discovered that the Soviets had gotten there first. Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise *The Evolution of Operational Art* is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modern Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion. This monograph discusses the role of intelligence in support of operational art. Intelligence support at all levels of war is critical for the commander to successfully apply force to achieve the established goals and objectives. This is particularly true at the operational level where the operational commander must translate strategic objectives into tactical actions. This monograph examines the characteristics and nature of intelligence support to the operational artist. The monograph first determines the definition of intelligence and its principles and characteristics. Intelligence is defined as information or knowledge of the enemy and environment, both of which are packaged for a specific customer's use in decision making. Furthermore, the principles of intelligence are based on the component parts of knowledge, otherwise identified as the verb know. The

principles are detect, recognize, and understand, representing levels of perception higher than the previous. Finally, the characteristics of intelligence are identified as relevant, timely, accurate, and predictive. Since operational art is rooted in theory, the monograph then briefly discusses the theoretical basis of the terms center of gravity, decisive point, and indirect approach from the standpoint of Carl Von Clausewitz, Antoine Henri Jomini, and Sun Tzu respectively. These concepts provide the basis to discuss operational art, or maneuver warfare. The monograph defines operational art as the conduct of military activities at the operational level through the translation of strategic objectives into tactical actions. More importantly, the tasks of the operational artist are defined. Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war--striking, screening, scouting, and basing--and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges. In today's environment of contingency operations and AEFs where training and continuity are some of the first operational casualties, the Air Force is not adequately using one of its strongest resources: the experience, operational expertise and corporate memory operational art, if you will of its military, GS and contractor professionals. Over the past 14 years the USAF has devoted much time and energy into refining its planning procedures. We've written and refined our basic service doctrine, made strong inputs into joint doctrine for air and space power use, developed PCE courses to educate our airmen and we've shared this knowledge with our allies and coalition partners. Joint Publication (JP) 3-30 Command and Control For Joint Air Operation, does an excellent job of identifying staff and functional requirements for planning, and executing the air and space portion joint force commander's (JFC) campaign. It even identifies some of the skill sets desired for personnel serving on the joint air and space commander's (JFACC) staff. How the JFACC gets people with the knowledge required on his staff is not addressed. Today's operational environment demonstrates US military forces routinely face adversaries who understand US doctrine and actively use asymmetric methods to combat us. By allowing untapped operational art expertise to languish, our planning is not as

effective or as efficient as it should be. This leads to operations that may cost more in terms of treasure, time opportunities and even lives. First published in limited numbers in 2005 by the United States Army Center of Military History. Contains an anthology of essays by historians and scholars who trace the origin and development of the operational level of warfare, the critical link between strategy and tactics. Includes essays about France, Germany, Russia and the Soviet Union, and the United States. Discusses 19th and 20th century wars mainly. Chapter 1 shortens the discussion of the operational environment found on the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, and emphasizes military operations. This chapter provides a framework of variables of an operational environment that shape their nature and affect outcomes. The chapter then discusses unified action and joint operations as well as land operations. Finally, this chapter discusses law of land warfare and combined arms. Chapter 2 introduces the Army's new operational concept of unified land operations. It discusses how commanders apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state. Chapter 2 discusses how commanders demonstrate the Army's new core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security conducted through decisive action. Chapter 3 discusses combat power and the warfighting functions used to generate combat power in support of unified land operations. As in the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, chapter 3 discusses the eight elements of combat power that include the six warfighting functions with leadership and information. Lastly, it discusses how Army forces achieve combined arms through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support. Chapter 4 discusses the elements of operational art and the meaning of operational art to Army forces. It elaborates on commanders and staffs applying the elements of operational art to understand, visualize, and describe how to establish conditions to achieve a desired end state. It discusses how operational art represents a creative approach to dealing with the direction of military forces and expresses an informed vision across the levels of war. Smallholder farmers and pastoralists fulfil an invaluable yet undervalued role in conserving biodiversity. They act as guardians of locally adapted livestock breeds that can make use of even marginal environments under tough climatic conditions and therefore are a crucial resource for food security. But in addition, by sustaining animals on natural vegetation and as part of local ecosystems, these communities also make a significant contribution to the conservation of wild biodiversity and of cultural landscapes. This publication provides a glimpse into the often intricate knowledge systems that pastoralists and smallholder farmers have developed for the management of their breeds in specific production systems and it also describes the multitude of threats and challenges these often marginalized communities have to cope with. The term 'operational art', coined by Soviet military theorists in the interwar period, has received increased attention in military circles with the debate on comparative NATO(North Atlantic

Treaty Organization) and Warsaw Pact operational capabilities during the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>1</sup> The interest in operational art also extended into the field of military history when the origins of operational art became the object of research. Some historians maintained that operational art first emerged in the American Civil War and Moltke's campaigns in 1866 and 1870-1871 as a child of the Industrial Revolution. Proponents of this position hold that the invention of rifled guns and infantry arms, the railway and the telegraph permitted the widely dispersed manoeuvre of independent bodies of troops which is a salient feature of operational art. "Publisher". This book explores the theoretical foundations and applications of military operational logistics (OpLog). OpLog theory has two facets: qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative facet is imbedded in the theory of operational level of war or operational art. It includes principles, imperatives and tenets, which are stated and analyzed in the first few chapters. The quantitative facet relates to the scientific aspects of OpLog. It is manifested by formal network models representing structural and operational features of an OpLog system. The book examines the two facets and integrates them into a unified presentation. Important OpLog applications are re-described and discussed. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to military logistics. Chapter 2 discusses the px;font-family: monospace;">general structure and characteristics of logistics and describes its three levels - strategic, operational and tactical. Chapter 3 describes the foundation of OpLog. Chapter 4 deals with OpLog planning. Chapter 5 addresses the issue of logistic information, and Chapter 6 deals with forecasting logistic demands. Chapters 7 and 8 are new additions to this second edition. They address logistics aspects of two contemporary operational topics - insurgencies and humanitarian assistance. Chapter 9 describes the first version of the logistic network model. Chapter 10 addresses an important OpLog characteristic - Flexibility. Chapter 11 discusses two major challenges in OpLog practice: force accumulation, 4419px; font-family: monospace;">and medical treatment and evacuation. Chapter 12 presents an inter-temporal network optimization model designed to determine deployment and employment of 3333px;font-family: monospace;">the OpLog support chain during military operations. David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level and its connection with deep battle, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its refinement and application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945. An operational artist is a leader who is able to skillfully use the tools of operational art to successfully plan and execute a major Operation or campaign. There is a difference between an operational practitioner (one who knows the fundamentals of operational art) and an operational artist (one who uses the tools of operational art to create a military masterpiece) . Those who are considered operational artists possess certain character traits that enable them to become truly great leaders. Those characteristics are courage, energy, and foresight. Courage, both

physical and moral, means the leader knows what is right (integrity) and pursues the right course despite personal danger or ridicule. Energy, both physical and mental, provides the leader the strength to persevere through the stressful and physically demanding time of conflict with a positive, 'can-do' attitude that the subordinates will emulate. Foresight enables the leader to not only look to the future, but also to look beyond the operational niche to see the grand plan. Foresight is key to planning and making midcourse corrections once the conflict has begun. Through the use of 'tools' associated with operational design and methods of combat employment, the operational artist plans and executes military operations. In each phase of operational design, from laying out guidance, through determining desired end state, objectives and enemy critical factors, to completion of the operational scheme, the artist's personal characteristics enable the leader to plan for and then execute large-scale operations. General Arnold was one of history's great operational artists, displaying throughout his career the characteristics that allowed him to make major contributions to Allied success in World War II as well as helping to found today's United States Air Force. Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art, a companion volume to Clayton R. Newell's and Michael D. Krause's On Operational Art, captures the doctrinal debate over the evolving concept of operational art-the critical link between strategy and tactics-in the face of the new complexities of warfare and the demands of irregular operations in the twenty-first century. Consisting of fifteen original essays selected and edited by Michael D. Krause in collaboration with R. Cody Phillips, the well-organized anthology presents the collective view of distinguished military historians and scholars that operational art must be adjusted to accommodate the changing circumstances happening around the world, especially when dealing with broad coalitions and alliances in regional environments and at an international level. Soldiers and students of military history will gain a new appreciation for the larger scope of warfare by studying the lessons in this thought-provoking work. Based on country specific case-studies, The Evolution of Operational Art describes how the concepts that underpin operational art originated, how they received practical expression in various campaigns, and how they developed over time. This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of "operational art," the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art. Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S.

military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled—and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II. Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II. After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries. Hybrid irregular and conventional military operations are playing an increasingly prominent role in international conflict. To counter this trend, the United States should adopt a new form of operational art for special warfare. From the foreword: "Bruce Menning's translation of Georgii Samoilovich Isserson's 1936 treatise *The Evolution of Operational Art*

is the best example available of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. Isserson, Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, and others like them were founding members of a focused military Enlightenment whose goal was to change the way armies and leaders thought about war. Moreover, unlike contemporaries such as B.H. Liddell Hart or Billy Mitchell, they had the opportunity to build their ideas into the modern Soviet Army and see their doctrine survive despite the existential challenges of Stalin's purges and the German invasion. I commend this work to you as a foundational text, one to which I hope you will refer repeatedly throughout your career." *The Art of Maneuver* shows how true maneuver-warfare theory has been applied in campaigns throughout history. With a genius for apt analogy the author shows how our obsession with fighting and winning set-piece battles causes us to overlook an enemy's true vulnerabilities. But as low-intensity conflicts promise to become the dominant warfare of the future, the importance of maneuver in attacking an enemy's critical vulnerability will render attrition approaches to warfighting ever more obsolete. Praise for *The Art of Maneuver* "Robert Leonhard is one of a number of prominent young military writers, like Daniel Bolger, John Antal, Bruce Gudmundsson, and Harold Raugh, whose work appears regularly in military journals. *The Art of Maneuver* is his first book, and military readers will appreciate his grasp of military history, forceful analysis, and adventurous writing style. . . . This is an important book which deserves the attention of military

professionals. . . . Leonhard deserves credit for a hard-nosed attempt to evaluate U.S. strengths and weaknesses as a basis for further improvements in service doctrine, training, and force development. . . . In the celebratory aftermath of a 'good war,' such honest self-appraisal is both healthy and encouraging."—Parameters "This commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations. . . . This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author's knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. . . . An important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!"—Marine Corps Gazette "Leonhard . . . has combined military expertise and historical analysis for an entertaining and fresh look at maneuver warfare. . . . In one volume, the author offers trenchant, exciting, and masterful perspective on victory in modern warfare."—National Defense "Robert Leonhard makes an outstanding contribution to our understanding of maneuver warfare in this book. . . . Our leaders, junior and senior alike, should find this book well worth reading and contemplating."—ARMOR Magazine "An important contribution to the on-going reassessment of U.S. Army doctrine . . . A must for anyone seriously interested in the future of Army doctrine—and the Army. . . . Further, it is an excellent starting point for young officers to begin their lifelong study of the art of war."—ARMY Magazine